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ABSTRACT 
India continues its resolve in developing a sea-based strategic deterrence in the 
form of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) carrying ballistic missiles. India’s 
ability to maintain security and stability within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is 
increasing as the United States seeks to share its security responsibility. The IOR 
continues to gain importance within the international order as the stability of the world’s 
economy depends on the security of these oceans. Rising powers such as China depend 
heavily upon resources that flow through the IOR and thus have great interest in 
influencing the security landscape of the region. India, situated in the center of the IOR, 
is also seeking to achieve great power status through influencing this region of the world. 
The security situation in this region is also unique in that the three major nations within 
this region are nuclear powers and have various levels of conflict under the nuclear 
umbrella. Pakistan and India continue to war over Kashmir and other such partition 
issues. China and India also have legacy border disputes that occasionally see clashes. 
This thesis finds that India’s security concerns will not be alleviated with sea-based 
nuclear weapons. The development of SSBNs will come at the expense of much needed 
conventional naval modernization, which is more suited for addressing India’s security 
concerns. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
India’s first indigenously developed nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), 
INS ARIHANT, went critical in 2013 and began sea trials in late 2014. As of 2021, 
ARIHANT has not sailed for an extended deterrence patrol beyond 20 days.1 This nuclear 
deterrence patrol arguably would not be considered a legitimate one, since the range of its 
nuclear missiles are too short to provide credible deterrence against China. India is 
currently building another SSBN, the INS ARIGHAT, but will need at least an additional 
three more SSBNs to establish a credible third leg of the nuclear triad.2 Meanwhile, India’s 
conventional naval platforms are aging, near retirement, and in dire need of modernization 
funding. With India’s navy already receiving the smallest share of the Indian defense 
budget, India’s insistence on developing a nuclear sea-based strategic deterrence may incur 
a substantial opportunity cost without yielding worthwhile reward.  
Does the Indian Navy’s pursuit of Sea-based nuclear weapons increase 
security for India and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and at what cost? This thesis 
explores India’s rationale for introducing sea-based strategic deterrence (SBSD) and its 
implications for India’s security in the IOR, including the safety, security, command and 
control, and operational challenges encountered in fielding nuclear weapons at sea. This 
thesis also analyzes opportunity costs, particularly in regard to India’s conventional naval 
forces, while India continues down the path of SSBN development.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Understanding whether India’s pursuit of nuclearizing its Navy will increase its 
security is important for both India’s bid for great power status as well as security and 
 
1 Sandeep Unnithan., “INS Arihant Returned Yesterday from 20-Day Deterrent Patrol,” India Today, 
June 1, 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ins-arihant-returned-yesterday-from-20-day-deterrent-
patrol-1383188-2018-11-05. 
2 Arun Prakash, “One INS Arihant Does Not Make For A Credible Nuclear Deterrence: Admiral Arun 
Prakash (Retd),” Indian Defence News, December 22, 2018, http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2018/12/
one-ins-arihant-does-not-make-for.html. 
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stability in the Indian Ocean Region. India is located at a strategically vital crossroads 
between two major sea lines of communication (SLOC): The Strait of Hormuz and Strait 
of Malacca. These heavily congested waters carry the majority of the world’s energy 
exports to feed China’s massive energy demands, along with India’s rapidly growing 
demands. Piracy, natural disasters, and other security concerns are steadily increasing as 
regional actors continue to move their national interests seaward.  
The Indian Navy is bracing for strategic competition with China in the IOR as 
maritime forces of both rising powers are competing to secure these SLOCs and vital 
maritime interests in two different maritime domains – the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. 
Simultaneously, India and Pakistan are involved in direct conflicts and tensions that have 
the potential of shifting from land to sea, which could spark a naval crisis and new arms 
competition at sea. India’s introduction of SBSD this milieu not only introduces nuclear 
dimensions to the naval competition, it poses logistical, technological, and operational 
challenges that the Indian Navy is unfamiliar with. 
Much of the literature on India’s decision to create the third leg of the nuclear triad 
focuses on the implications of security, under the assumption that India succeeds in 
creating credible SBSD. However, India will need to overcome several resource intensive 
challenges beyond just placing nuclear weapons at sea, in order to establish a credible 
deterrence. India’s interests in the IOR also may be better served by strengthening its 
conventional maritime capabilities. Pursuing nuclear weapons at sea arguably does very 
little to improve their security situation, while imposing a heavy opportunity cost on their 
conventional naval forces.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Outdated Nuclear Doctrine 
Contemporary Nuclear deterrence theory still hinges on the successes of the United 
States–Soviet Union dyad during the Cold War. The theory draws its legitimacy from the 
fact that these two super-powers were able to avoid all out nuclear war during the tense 
period of great power rivalry. However, the dangers of applying a one-size-fits-all model 
3 
onto other dyads are beginning to surface among scholarly debates. The actual 
effectiveness of Cold War nuclear deterrence has also been questioned.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis is often cited as an episode during the Cold War where 
deterrence doctrine prevailed, however a retrospective analysis has revealed that disaster 
could have been avoided by mere chance.3 Diana Wueger notes that during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, Soviet submarines almost fired nuclear tipped torpedoes at U.S. warships 
over a miscommunication. The United States’ publicly transited doctrine, dropping depth 
charge sounding signals to discovered submarines within the blockade zone, was not 
received by Soviet Union commands. Soviet submarines believed that they were under 
attack, rather than merely told to surface. Fortunately, at the time, the Chief of Staff 
Arkhipov was onboard, and had the restraint to not fire his nuclear weapons, which would 
have likely escalated the situation to further nuclear launches from both sides.4 It is 
impossible to infer if India, Pakistan, or China would show similar restraint in such a 
situation, especially with their smaller fleets generating a use/lose dilemma.  
2. Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia  
India’s reasoning for the development of the INS ARIHANT seems 
straightforward; to establish the third and arguably most assured leg of the nuclear triad. 
However, much of the current deterrence theory framework is based on the U.S.–Russia 
Cold War deterrence relationship. The South Asian region where India resides, sandwiched 
between two nuclear weapon wielding countries, may have a completely different 
deterrence dynamic. Arnold and Brown note in their article “The Quirks of Nuclear 
Deterrence,” “The calculus of deterrence would seem to become impossibly complex as 
the number of nuclear weapons states increases.”5 In their article, they argue that bipolar 
theories of deterrence likely do not apply to multipolar regions with the additional variables 
 
3 Diana Beth Wueger, “Deterring War or Courting Disaster: An Analysis of Nuclear Weapons in the 
Indian Ocean” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 30, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/
10945/45278. 
4 Wueger, 31. 
5 Andrew Brown and Lorna Arnold, “The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Relations 24, 
no. 3 (September 2010): 293–312, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117810377278. 
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that come into play such as culture, leader temperament, non-state actors; the list grows as 
more countries gain nuclear weapons capabilities.  
Following the argument that South Asian nuclear deterrence likely differs from the 
accepted Cold War theories of deterrence, it is possible to argue that deterrence and 
stability has already been achieved in South Asia. Proliferation optimists such as Ganguly 
cite India and Pakistan’s conflict-ridden relationship as evidence that nuclear deterrence is 
working.6 The still unresolved Kashmir and Jammu territory disputes which led to the 1998 
Kargil Conflict, 2001–2002 Pakistani-backed terrorist conflict, and Pakistani backed 
terrorist attacks in 2008, all serve as examples of possible catalysts for the outbreak of 
conventional warfare that may have been tempered by the effects of nuclear deterrence.  
The Sino-Indian relationship remains rocky, but nuclear deterrence stability may 
have also already been established. Similar to the India-Pakistan relationship, China and 
India have an unresolved border dispute with China enjoying the conventional forces 
superiority in this dyad. Conflicts and disputes continue to emerge due to this area in the 
Himalayas, even as recently as 2017 in the Doklam plateau with military mobilization from 
both sides, which was later resolved diplomatically. Maxwell argues that China has shown 
a willingness to resolve this border dispute peacefully, as it has done with all its other 
bordering nations.7 Whereas Garver believes China is leaving the border issue open as a 
political ploy, to deter India from supporting anti-China Tibetan movements.8 The existing 
nuclear deterrence may already be preventing China from wanting to escalate the border 
dispute beyond sporadic stand-offs.  
India is intimately familiar with land-based conflicts with Pakistan and China. 
However, it does not have much experience with them in the maritime domain. Many 
challenges and solutions applicable to continental conflict may not translate into the 
 
6 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in 
South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), Kindle. 
7 Neville Maxwell, “Why the Sino–Indian Border Dispute Is Still Unresolved after 50 Years: A 
Recapitulation,” China Report 47, no. 2 (May 2011): 71–82, https://doi.org/10.1177/000944551104700202. 
8 John Garver, “The Unresolved Sino–Indian Border Dispute: An Interpretation,” China Report 47, no. 
2 (May 2011): 99–113, https://doi.org/10.1177/000944551104700204. 
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language of the sea. India has the geographical advantage in the IOR, which it could 
leverage more effectively with traditional naval forces where role of nuclear deterrence is 
limited in meeting the nature of challenges conventional navy is likely to encounter.  
3. Indian Naval Strategy  
India has traditionally been a continental power, focusing its national and military 
strategy to its north-western border with Pakistan and north-eastern border with China. 
Pakistan’s navy was not a concern, and China’s navy did not have the capabilities of 
operating in the IOR. As a result of Indian military’s land orientation and lack of credible 
sea-based threats, the Indian Navy has been severely underfunded until more recent times.9 
Rajagopalan states that Indian Navy procurements were mainly based on budget 
limitations, and not on a strategic assessment.  
India’s more recent naval strategy is difficult to determine, despite their publicly 
released Maritime Strategy papers. The 2007 Freedom to Use the Seas Maritime Strategy 
documents covers a wide range of every possible role India’s navy could play, but its lack 
of prioritization of on missions or capabilities results in the document providing limited 
insight on India’s strategy.10 Rajagopalan believes that Indian’s naval strategy consists of 
deterring or defeating Pakistan, deterring China, countering existing and novel security 
threats, and protecting trade and commerce. In 2015, India provided an updated Maritime 
strategy document named, Ensuring Secure Seas: India’s Maritime Strategy, which reflects 
some updates on India’s naval thinking. Khurana notes that the main additions and updates 
are an expansion of India’s areas of interest to include the Western Pacific, acceptance of 
Net security provider for the IOR, and the rationale behind developing Sea-Based Nuclear 
Deterrence.11 
 
9 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India’s Maritime Strategy,” in India’s Naval Strategy and Asian 
Security, ed. Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan (London: Routledge, 2016), 15, https://doi.org/10.4324/
9781315668512.  
10 Rajagopalan, 28. 
11 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “India’s Maritime Strategy: Context and Subtext,” Maritime Affairs: Journal 
of the National Maritime Foundation of India 13, no. 1 (January 2017): 14–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09733159.2017.1309747.  
6 
Sub-optimal procurement of naval technologies and modernization raises questions 
on whether the Indian navy can handle its current and future ambitions. Misalignments of 
naval strategy and defense spending could partially explain the current state of the Indian 
Navy. Rajagopalan notes, “Often the Indian ambitions in this regard are part of its larger 
goal of achieving a big power status than a carefully considered maritime strategy”.12 As 
of 2015, Indian has only 20 surface combatants, which include its two aircraft carriers. 
India’s submarine fleet is down to fourteen boats that are approaching their operational life 
cycle. India’s focus on its continued development of a carrier-centric Navy may also hinder 
its ability to accomplish its naval missions. A carrier is unquestionably useful for 
humanitarian assistance and disaster evacuations, as well as granting prestige to that nation. 
However, its strategic value has come under debate especially in the IOR.13 Rehman posits 
that aircraft carriers, especially the ones with shorter-range aircraft, like in the case of 
India’s aircraft carriers, are vulnerable to enemy shore defenses, while being unable to 
project power safely ashore. India’s relatively small naval budget cannot afford the luxury 
of maintaining such resource intensive platforms that arguably are becoming liabilities. But 
Indian maritime strategy and the IOR geopolitical situation might not necessitate operating 
United States style super carriers.  
One of India’s major challenges is protection of its two SLOCs – the Strait of 
Malacca and Strait of Hormuz. Piracy and blockades are the primary security challenges 
in these areas. SSBNs equip with nuclear weapons do not provide much value against 
preventing blockages, and arguably provide no value against piracy. Smaller, faster surface 
crafts, or diesel submarines would be more suitable in these mission areas. In times of war, 
India may also desire to impose blockades against Pakistan or China. Again, SSBNs are 
not optimized for this role. Conventional submarines, destroyers, and cruisers would be 
more effective means of blockading strait transits.  
 
12 Rajagopalan, “India’s Maritime Strategy,” 31. 
13 Rajagopalan, 51. 
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D. HYPOTHESES 
Within the framework of the research question, this thesis investigates two main 
hypotheses: 1) India’s pursuit of SBSD will increase India’s stability and security within 
the IOR and 2) India’s pursuit of SBSD leaves India vulnerable to other security threats 
while it attempts to achieve a credible sea-based deterrence. 
The first hypothesis suggests that India’s intentions and current progress on creating 
a sea-based deterrence has already produced dividends for India’s security and regional 
stability. Wueger notes, “estimates vary, but the total figure for the ARIHANT-class fleet 
is thought to be in the range of 5–6 boats, which is hardly enough to induce a rethink of 
Chinese strategy and force posture.”14 This assessment was made in 2015 well before INS 
ARIHANT’s first deterrence patrol. China seemed to have no response to INS ARIHANT’s 
initial launch and sea trials. India plans to launch the INS ARIGHAT in 2020,15 which may 
cause China to reconsider its stance toward India’s deterrence capabilities. Evidence 
supporting this thesis could come from Chinese news articles more actively discussing 
Indian nuclear capabilities, but this information would also have to be coupled with 
indications that China has softened its stances in disputes between India due to India’s 
emerging SBSD. The timeframe necessary to field 5–6 SSBNS for India is difficult to pin 
down, as INS ARIHANT was extremely delayed. Former Chief of the Indian Navy, Arun 
Pradesh stated in 2018, that it may take 50–60 years for India to develop enough SSBNs 
and supporting SSNs to have a constant credible deterrence patrol..16 
The second hypothesis argues that in the interim between developing and 
establishing an effective SBSD, India could be placing itself in a vulnerable situation. This 
effect could come from 1) balancing or arms racing from China and Pakistan, 2) safety 
issues and accidents occurring during submarine testing, or 3) funds diverted to the SSBN 
 
14 Wueger, “Deterring War or Courting Disaster,” 63. 
15 Ankit Panda, “India Conducts Second January 2020 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test” 
The Diplomat, December 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/report-indian-submarine-launched-
ballistic-missile-test-fails/. 




program leading to deterioration of India’s conventional naval fleet and ability to counter 
traditional threats within the IOR.  
China has shown so far to be largely indifferent, but that may change with the 
launch of the INS ARIGHAT. China may send ASW patrols into the IOR to ascertain 
India’s nuclear submarine capabilities.17 Wueger argues that an increased Chinese 
presence in the IOR is the opposite of India’s intentions and could heighten the chances of 
incidents at sea. Pakistan will likely be more alarmed as India progresses along its path 
toward completing the nuclear triad. Pakistan has already begun developing nuclear tipped 
missiles to place on its diesel submarines. India’s persistence and progress on its own 
SSBNs will likely add a sense of urgency to Pakistan’s ambitions.18 These developments 
could be problematic to India, as Pakistan does not have a NFU policy and also claims to 
have no qualms about using tactical nukes. Thus, Pakistan has lower hurdles to overcome 
to credibly threaten India with sea-launched nuclear weapons. There is evidence to support 
that India’s insistence on a SBSD has led to Pakistan developing its own SBSD sooner.  
While India is diverting its limited naval budget to developing its SSBN program, 
its conventional platforms may become underfunded and unable to conduct its other 
missions in the IOR. India’s SSBN program is extremely expensive, coupled with its 
resource intensive carrier centric surface navy. SSBNs cannot assist in other mission areas 
Beyond nuclear deterrence, such as anti-piracy, humanitarian assistance disaster relief 
(HADR), non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), SLOC protection, or escorts- all 
critical missions that the Indian Navy currently conduct. Evidence showing mission 
degradation in these areas due to underfunding, would strengthen this hypothesis on 
reduced security. 
 
17 Wueger, “Deterring War or Courting Disaster,” 63. 
18 Iskander Luke Rehman, “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship 
in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 69, https://digital-
commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss4/8. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research uses the comparative case method to examine if India’s continued 
pursuit of developing a credible sea-based strategic deterrence is based on strategically 
sound logic. Is the trade-off from diverting resources away from conventional naval 
platforms creating greater vulnerability to Indian security interests in the IOR? Case studies 
are appropriate for my study due to the small sample size of cases, only five other countries 
have a confirmed credible submarine ballistic missile based nuclear deterrence..19  
This thesis tests the challenges of SBSD efficacy based on The United States’ and 
Russia’s experience with development of SSBN and sea launched strategic deterrence 
compared to India’s progress thus far on developing its own ballistic missile submarines. 
There is extensive literature on this case study, but since the situation is constantly 
changing, this thesis will focus more on recent work on India’s progress and setbacks in 
comparison to Russian and United States experiences. While the Cold War provides an 
important comparative case, most of the research here focuses on the Indian case due to 
the importance of the new development in the region and IOR overall. These case studies 
highlight the challenges India will need to overcome to field a credible nuclear deterrence 
from the sea. This research uses the United States case study because it likely has the most 
transparent and credible information. Other countries likely still have their information 
classified. Information on Russia’s case study may be more difficult to find, but since India 
has learned most of its nuclear operations and deterrence from the Russians, it will be 
important to research the Russian framework  
This research also investigates India’s stated naval strategy and the security 
challenges it faces in the IOR. By comparing India’s security concerns to the process of 
obtaining the third leg of the nuclear triad, it will become clear on whether India’s actions 
will advance or hinder its goals in the region.  
 
19 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 2008): 294, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077. 
10 
The thesis draws upon government documents, existing literature, news articles, 
economic data, and international treaties to paint a clearer picture of the results of India’s 
ambitions. Government documents, such as India’s official maritime strategy papers will 
provide a solid base for insight into domestic government perceptions of the issue. News 
articles and economic data will assist in determining the cost of India’s actions both 
domestically and internationally. Existing international treaties can highlight the 
constraints the countries in the IOR are operating under.  
F. ROADMAP 
The first chapter has introduced the research question, existing literature, 
hypotheses, and research design. The second chapter will delve into India’s maritime 
strategy and the unique security issues between the regional actors within the IOR. The 
third chapter examines SBSD development and highlight the safety, security, 
technological, command and control and concept of operation obstacles India will need to 
overcome to successfully create a credible sea-based deterrence. The fourth chapter will 
offer potential solutions for India’s challenges of establishing a credible SBSD, based on 
other countries’ experiences. The fourth chapter will conclude the thesis with trade-offs 
and a net assessment on best courses of actions to meet the Indian Navy’s objectives.  
11 
II. INDIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
REGION 
India is traditionally seen as a continental power, with most of its security concerns 
existing on its northwestern borders with Pakistan, and northeastern frontier with China. 
However, India has recently placed increased priority on developing its maritime 
capabilities to include placing nuclear weapons at sea. Indian strategists and leaders believe 
that the neglected naval domain is crucial to their continued bid for great power status.20 
Meanwhile extra-regional actors such as China are vying for control and influence within 
the Indian Ocean, threatening India’s ambitions for regional hegemony. The Indian Ocean 
Region’s criticality in modern geopolitics offers a new arena for India to assert its 
dominance on its quest to achieve regional hegemony and eventual great power status.  
As nearly all of India’s actions are shaped by interactions with its neighboring 
competitors, India’s current drive to nuclearize its Navy should be carefully reviewed 
within the context of its unique security concerns and regional relationships. Sea-based 
strategic deterrence does offer added security in certain situations; however, India cannot 
assume it will automatically offer the solutions to India’s specific needs and desires.  
This chapter will start by discussing India’s historical and current relationships with 
China and Pakistan. It then delves into the immense geopolitical importance of the IOR, 
India’s strategic position within the IOR and its existing and future security concerns 
arising from this location. This chapter will conclude by discussing India’s reason for its 
new focus on maritime capabilities and naval strategy. Overall, it shows that the 
development of India’s SSBN program will inevitably pull funds away from the Indian 
Navy’s conventional arms’ much needed modernization efforts. Most of India’s security 
concerns regarding the IOR are better addressed with conventional naval assets. 
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A. HISTORICAL REGIONAL INTERACTIONS AND RIVALRIES 
In order to better understand India’s maritime ambitions and intentions, it is 
important to review the historical interactions between its two major competitors/
adversaries. Pakistan has been firmly rooted in the adversary camp, whereas China has 
fluctuated from almost allies to a more competitive with adversarial tendencies 
relationship. India has open-border disputes with both countries, which will likely become 
areas of contention within the maritime realm as each country involved tries to gain 
leverage to overcome the stalemate on land. 
1. Pakistan—Legacy of Partition  
The India- Pakistan rivalry emerged from the sub-continent’s independence, which 
included a violent partition in 1947. A mass migration of over 10 million people occurred 
as both Muslim and Hindu populations scrambled to join their respective newly formed 
nations. An estimated 200,000 to 500,000 deaths occurred from the ensuing struggle.21 
Before the dust from the partition could settle, the first war between India and Pakistan 
broke out over the territory Jammu and Kashmir. This Muslim majority but Hindu ruled 
area originally wanted to remain independent. However, Jinnah believed that Jammu and 
Kashmir and its Muslim population rightfully belonged to Pakistan and launched an 
invasion to accede the state by force. The leaders of Kashmir, Hari Singh and Sheik 
Abdullah, requested assistance from India to fend off the invasion, in return for officially 
acceding to India. The first Kashmir war ended in a UN mandated ceasefire in 1948, with 
the creation of a Line of Control (LOC). This border dispute would result in an additional 
two wars, with no resolution to this day. The LOC remains patrolled by the militaries of 
both sides. The two countries also fought a war in 1971 which resulted in India assisting 
East Pakistan in gaining its independence, resulting in modern day Bangladesh which 
added to the tensions between the two countries.  
T.V. Paul characterizes the India-Pakistan rivalry as an enduring, asymmetrical 
one, in which there is a “persistent, fundamental, and long-term incompatibility of goals 
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between the two states.”22 He argues that a compromise over the border dispute has been 
impossible because India and Pakistan’s goals for Kashmir are mutually exclusive and 
further complicated by the fact that the Kashmiri citizens also have a will of their own. 
Pakistan firmly believes that Jammu and Kashmir is critical for their national Islamic 
identity on the subcontinent, arguing that the Muslim-majority within the region wish to 
be part of Pakistan.23 India’s claim to Jammu and Kashmir originate from its identity as a 
secular-nation and that succeeding the area based on religious factors would result in 
separatist movements gaining traction among other regions in India.24 Paul also states that 
within Kashmir, many nationalist groups exist that would prefer independence over 
belonging to either countries. It is under these conflicting desires that has fueled the border 
dispute to this current day: Pakistan’s belief that Kashmir must join its fellow Muslims, 
India at most willing to allow Kashmir to run autonomously under Indian rule, and factions 
of Kashmiri citizens wanting complete independence.  
The dispute over Kashmir also contains resource control elements as critical water 
resources feeding Pakistan and India flow through the conflict areas. Pakistan depends on 
the Indus River system that flows through Kashmir for its freshwater needs. Whereas India 
has been looking toward the river system to help feed its growing energy demands. The 
Indus Water Treaty was signed by India and Pakistan in 1960 in hopes of alleviating 
possible conflict that would emerge. The resource sharing treaty has been effective for the 
most part, but the battle for the control of the river system adds another layer of difficulty 
to resolving the Kashmir dispute. 
The political stalemate between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is mirrored in the 
military dimension; neither side has the ability to impose their will through kinetic 
operations. India seems to be at a clear advantage from a purely numbers analysis of key 
components of strength. Paul notes “ the differentials between India and Pakistan in 
 
22 T. V. Paul, ed., The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 3. 
23 Paul, 9. 
24 Paul, 9. 
14 
terms of aggregate indicators are approximately: population: 6:1; size: 4:1; GDP: 8.5:1; 
defense expenditures: 6:1; and total number of active forces: 2:1. Only in per capita income 
is the ratio closer.25  
Paul argues that these extreme differences are not enough in understanding the full 
picture.26 Pakistan’s military tactics/strategies, unique dynamics within the rivalry, and 
great power influence is more crucial in understanding how Pakistan can challenge a 
conventionally superior India. Although India has twice as many soldiers as Pakistan, this 
advantage is almost completely negated by the fact that nearly half of India’s troops are 
deployed to defend its border with China.27 Pakistan is able to focus almost all of its troops 
against India resulting in India only having a slight numerical advantage over Pakistan. 
Paul notes that even though Pakistan has a slight numerical deficit, this disadvantage is 
diluted by the fact that Pakistan’s forces are stationed closer to the disputed border. 
Pakistan only needs 96 hours to mobilize its forces into position, whereas India would need 
seven to ten days to do the same because of where its troops are stationed.28 India has to 
be prepared to defend both is border against China and Pakistan. Whereas Pakistan only 
has to focus on its eastern border with India. Pakistan’s strategy to use asymmetric, 
guerrilla type warfare further exposes India’s mobilization speed weakness.29  
India and Pakistan’s differing agendas concerning Kashmir further allows Pakistan 
to leverage its geographical and mobilization timeline advantage. India’s status quo 
strategy places them in a defensive posture, whereas Pakistan’s irredentist claims require 
them to remain on the offensive and attempt to hold onto any gains they make with short 
intense warfare.30 India’s counter to Pakistan’s strategy has been to escalate the conflict 
with an attack on the Punjab region. India reasons that Pakistan would be unable to sustain 
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a two front war given their conventional inferiority.31 Paul argues that the introduction of 
nuclear weapons to the region has complicated this calculation. Pakistan has not agreed to 
a No First Use policy (NFU) and claims that it will use tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons if India escalates the conflict too far.  
Great Power intervention, namely from The United States and China, has also 
provided Pakistan with the ability to continue challenging India. The United States has had 
a long-standing but tumultuous alliance with Pakistan. Pakistan allowed the United States 
to have a presence during the Cold War Era as a strategic base for spying on the Soviet 
Union. Pakistan has also been the United States’ main partner in the Global War on Terror. 
In exchange for these benefits, Pakistan has received over 30 billion dollars’ worth of 
funding as well as various military arms deals.32  United States military assistance has 
given Pakistan the ability to afford weapons in much higher quality and quantity than their 
GDP would have allowed, which has played a crucial factor in sustaining Pakistan’s rivalry 
with India. The United States has not given Pakistan direct kinetic military assistance in its 
conflicts with India. However, in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Nixon sent the USS 
Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal under the guise of humanitarian evacuation assistance.33 
Ganguly notes that this action was likely a weak attempt at a show of force, but also likely 
had no effect since the war had already reached termination by the time the U.S. forces 
were in the region.  
China’s “all-weather” alliance with Pakistan has arguably impacted Indo-Pak 
relationships more than Pakistan’s alliance with the United States. China has also provided 
Pakistan with immense military aid in the form of tanks, aircraft, production facilities, and 
missiles.34  However, the most significant Chinese contributions to Pakistan were 
resources and knowledge to create a nuclear weapon. Ganguly states “China’s nuclear 
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backing of Pakistan included the lending of men and material, the transfer of a range of 
critical technologies, and above all the design of a nuclear warhead. Without Chinese 
support, Pakistan could not have built a successful nuclear deterrent in the 1980s.”35 The 
Indo-Pak rivalry and geopolitical situation of the South Asian region would likely be 
completely different in a world where Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons.  
2. China—From Friend to Foe 
The Indo-Sino relationship is much more complicated than the Indo-Pakistan 
rivalry. Both relationships share the feature of an open-border dispute, but the similarities 
quickly diverge on most other aspects. Pakistan falls within a spectrum of mortal enemy to 
enduring thorn in India’s side. Whereas China’s status has fluctuated from a peak in the 
1950s with the phrase “Hindi-Chini bhai,” to its darkest hour with the 1962 Indo-China 
War.36 India’s relationship with China is best characterized by two key factors – The 
aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war which not only failed to resolve the lingering border 
dispute, but also created a sense of inferiority and distrust of China among the Indian 
people. China’s alliance with Pakistan further complicates the Sino-India relationship by 
exacerbating India’s feeling of encirclement and perceived or actual threat on India’s 
ambitions of regional dominance. 
The Sino-Indian relationship reached a critical juncture during the 1962 Indo-China 
War; the aftermath has tainted all efforts of friendly co-existence to this current day. The 
origin of the war was due to unresolved borders inherited from the British Empire when 
India gained independence. China and India attempted to resolve the issue diplomatically 
but were unable to come to a mutually acceptable border. Bilateral relations between the 
two countries quickly deteriorated after a Tibetan uprising in 1959 which was put down 
violently by China and resulted in the Dalai Lama seeking political asylum in India. These 
events created domestic pressure for Nehru to adopt more aggressive policies regarding the 
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border dispute.37 Westcott notes that Mao took on a more aggressive stance as well to 
reconsolidate his power after losing most of his supporters due to his failed Great Leap 
Forward Policy during the same year. The collision of these aggressive postures resulted 
in a brief war in which China convincingly defeated India, resulting in humiliation that has 
remained in India to modern times.38 A status quo stalemate has existed since 1962 with 
minor skirmishes and fluctuating tensions.  
The modern-day Sino-India relationship involves extensive trade connections, as 
well as common goals such as anti-piracy and economic development, however regional 
dominance and a possible security dilemma continues to generate obstacles for peaceful 
cooperation. The lingering border dispute only serves as a constant reminder of mutual 
distrust. Nehru himself said in 1962, “It is a little naïve to think that the trouble with China 
was essentially due to a dispute over some territory. It had deeper reasons. Two of the 
largest countries in Asia confronted each other over a vast border. They differed in many 
ways. And the test was whether any one of them would have a more dominating position 
than the other on the border and in Asia itself.”39 Nehru’s accurate and timeless assessment 
of the Sino-India relationship was continental centric, but he probably would not be 
surprised that with the growing importance of the Indian Ocean Region, this relationship 
would have similar dynamics in the maritime realm.  
B. THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION  
The Indian Ocean region is arguably the most critical ocean region in the twenty-
first century.40 Mao points out that the Indian Ocean ranks third in ocean area, is heavily 
traversed by maritime traffic, and includes many strategic and economic choke points such 
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as Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Lombok Strait, Strait of Malacca, and the Palk 
Strait.41 Ninety percent of the world’s trade and two-thirds of the world’s oil is transported 
by sea; the Indian Ocean carries through it about half of the world’s seaborne commerce.42 
With the addition of the oil rich middle east and mineral ores in South Africa, the IOR’s 
geopolitical importance cannot be understated. All of the world’s major powers have a 
keen interest in maintaining stability and accessibility to this region, and India’s peninsular 
central location within the IOR offers it a distinct geographical advantage in projecting its 
influence.  
India’s influence in the IOR will not go uncontested, as China has both economic 
and strategic reasons for developing an enduring presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s 
primary concerns within the IOR involve maintaining open and safe sea lanes of 
communication.43 The Chinese economy has grown, on average, about 9–10 percent for 
the past thirty years.44 In order to maintain this growth rate, China needs to ensure its 
energy and trade goods continue to arrive uninterrupted. A majority of China’s energy 
requirements must transit through the Strait of Hormuz to the Indian Ocean. Eighty percent 
of China’s crude oil needs transits from the Indian Ocean, through the Straits of Malacca.45 
China’s previous president Hu Jing Tao coined the phrase “Malacca Strait dilemma,” in 
reference to China’s concerns of a possible blockade choking off this vital trade route.46 
Although the feasibility of a blockade of the Straits of Malacca, without starting a full-
scale war, is disputed, China has been rapidly increasing its presence in the Indian ocean 
to include berthing leases in Sri Lanka, a PLAN base in Djibouti, and funding Pakistan’s 
port in Gwadar.  
 
41 Jikang and Mingjiang, 35. 
42 Jikang and Mingjiang, 35. 
43 Jingdong Yuan, “China and the Indian Ocean: New Departures in Regional Balancing,” in Deep 
Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security, ed. John Garofano and Andrea J. 
Dew (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 160, Kindle.  
44 “China GDP Annual Growth Rate | 1989–2020 Data | 2021–2023 Forecast | Calendar,” Trading 
Economics, accessed February 26, 2021, https://tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual. 
45 Steven Stashwick, “China’s Security Gambit in the Indian Ocean,” The Diplomat, last modified 
May 11, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/chinas-security-gambit-in-the-indian-ocean/.  
46 Jikang and Mingjiang, “Between Engagement and Counter-Hedging.” 35.  
19 
Pakistan also encourages increased PLAN presence in the IOR as a hedge against 
India’s growing naval superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan.47 Pakistan’s vulnerability to blockade 
is well known, as experienced by Pakistan first-hand in 1971.48 Instead of modernizing the 
Pakistani Navy to confront this security dilemma. In “Deep Currents and Rising Tides,” 
Yusuf believes Pakistan is leveraging its alliance with China to create a deterrence effect 
against possible Indian hostility. Projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC) increases China’s interest in maintaining stability in that region. Pakistan has also 
offered to allow China to use Gwadar Port as an overseas Navy base. China claims it has 
no interest in doing so, but Pakistan hopes that the presence of Chinese merchant vessels 
would discourage Indian attempts at blockading Pakistan.49 
The United States’ rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific is influencing India’s 
maritime force development. The United States is a traditional naval power that has taken 
on the role of providing security and stability in the Indian Ocean, particularly in Arabian 
sea and Persian Gulf region. With China’s growing activities in the IOR and the United 
States’ shrinking Navy, the United States is looking toward India to become the “net 
security provider” in the Indian Ocean. The term “net security provider” was first 
introduced in 2009 by United States and has shown up in various Indian documents since.50 
The net security provider’s role is to increase the security for more than one nation 
operating in the region, to include operations such as counter-piracy, natural disasters, or 
terrorism. The concept of “net security provider” is further elaborated in India’s 2015 
Maritime strategy document, Ensuring Secure Seas¸ revealing a more official acceptance 
of India’s role and increased responsibilities.51 
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One of India’s major responsibilities as a net security provider is countering the 
threats of non-state actors to include piracy and maritime terrorist attacks. Piracy in the 
IOR reached its apex in 2000 with approximately 75 incidents in the Straits of Malacca 
alone.52 With the efforts of multiple nations to include China, United States and India, the 
number of occurrences experienced rapidly declined, with almost zero incidents by 2013.53 
Piracy continues to occur in other regions within the IOR. With the abundance of trade and 
natural resources transiting the Indian Ocean, the area will continue to be an attractive 
target for pirate organizations. The Indian navy will likely need to play a greater role in 
anti-piracy operations especially if India wishes to decrease Chinese presence in the IOR. 
A resurgence in piracy would also likely give the Chinese navy more legitimacy in 
increasing its presence as it already has done by building a naval base in Djibouti.  
Non-state actors in the form of terrorism also threaten the stability of the IOR. The 
Indian Navy has failed to counter maritime terrorism in the past, and this mission set 
continues to be an area of concern to modern day. In 1993 and 2008, Mumbai was targeted 
by terrorist bombing attacks.54 In both instances, explosives were smuggled into India via 
the ocean undetected by the Indian Navy or Coastguard. Harsh Pant notes that even having 
received clear intelligence of Pakistan’s plan to smuggle terrorist in from the ocean, the 
Indian navy and Coastguard still failed in interdicting the inbound vessels.55 
Whether China is following a calculated grand strategy of “string of pearls” or the 
more generally accepted “places, not bases” economic and logistical network, Indian 
policymakers are beginning to feel uncomfortable with China’s growing influence in 
India’s “backyard.” Pakistan’s encouragement of a Chinese naval presence only furthers 
India’s fears of being encircled. In response to these catalysts and The United States’ desire 
for India to play a bigger role in the IOR, Indian policymakers and scholars have begun 
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expressing the need for increased Naval modernization efforts. India’s 2015 Maritime 
strategy document, Ensuring Secure Seas, states “by virtue of our geography, we are… in 
a position to greatly influence the movement/security of shipping along the SLOCs in the 
(IOR) provided we have maritime power to do so. Control of the choke points could be 
used as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military 
power remains a stark reality.”56 Whether India is on the correct path to leverage its 
geography and increase its maritime power to achieve its goals in the IOR, is up for serious 
debate.  
C. THE INDIAN NAVY 
The Indian Navy will play a critical role in achieving India’s goals in the IOR as 
well as providing security against India’s threats. However, the development of India’s 
SSBN program will pull funds away from the Indian Navy’s conventional arms’ much 
needed modernization efforts. The Indian Navy is finally gaining the spotlight it deserves 
and moving away from its status as the “Cinderella” Service. However, many obstacles 
still remain which include budgetary defense spending, political factors, and structural 
industrial issues. Since India’s independence the Indian Navy has always received the 
smallest share of the defense budget; ranging from as low as 3–8% in the 90s, up to more 
recent highs of 10–19% in the 2000s.57 The Indian Army has always received the largest 
portion of funding, which is understandable during the early years given India’s mainly 
continental concerns. However, drastic cuts to Indians 1.4 million personnel army will need 
to be made if India wants to remain competitive with China. Not only does China have a 
much larger GDP, but it has also already reduced its army by half to allocate more resources 
to the PLAN.58 
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Although India has made great strides in spending increases for the navy, the year-
to-year fluctuations coupled with India’s lacking indigenous shipyard capabilities have 
resulted in severe delays and overspending. Asset acquisition in the navy is unique in that 
platforms have the longest lead time from initial idea to commissioning. Budget deficit 
effects will only be seen five to ten years down the road, thereby magnifying small changes 
many folds into significant delays. The effect of these delays can be readily seen in India’s 
current force structure. An RSIS report published in 2010 projected the Indian Navy to 
have two operational aircraft carriers by 2015 and a third by 2020.59 Currently India only 
has one aircraft carrier and has delayed the commissioning of its second to 2022.60 The 
Indian Navy has similarly fallen short in destroyer/cruiser projections and only maintaining 
submarine numbers by pushing the platforms past their service lives.61 In order to maintain 
the navy’s aging fleet, the Indian Navy needs to be able to manufacture five new ships a 
year.62 India’s shipyard can currently only manage three ships in that timeframe.63 
India’s recent efforts in naval modernization are commendable and the progress 
being made is tangible. However, China’s rapid modernization and overall larger resource 
pool, along with Pakistan’s continuing efforts to drain India’s resources in border disputes 
while leveraging its alliance with China, means India still faces choppy seas ahead. India 
could trim down its extremely ambitious goals and wait until its military capabilities catch-
up, but that course of action would likely not be politically palatable. Otherwise, India will 
need to figure out how to allocate more resources to the navy while balancing continental 
concerns with the army and air force. Overhaul her defense acquisition and production 
capabilities to keep up with the military’s requirements. In the interim to creating a world-
class navy, India could lean more on extra-regional players such as the United States. 
Whether or not India can achieve regional hegemony will depend heavily on its “Cinderella 
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service” receiving the attention and resources it needs sooner than later. The importance of 
the IOR will only increase in the future, with additional stakeholders vying for influence; 
India’s geographical advantage is slowly dwindling as the tides of geopolitical competition 
continue to rise.  
This chapter has attempted to paint the general milieu of where Indian is intending 
to introduce SBSD in the form of SSBNs carrying ballistic missiles. India will have to 
carefully consider many complex variables given its unique geopolitical situation. The 
region India intends to operate in, the IOR, is extremely critical for the World’s economy 
and energy security. Thus, many regional and extra-regional actors are vying for control or 
influence. India has enduring border disputes with the other major power in the region, 
which will likely continue into the maritime realm, and will become even more concerning 
with the nuclear dimension. Within India itself, there exists many problems in naval 
funding and asset acquisition that will only become more pronounced with India’s attempt 
to develop a weapon system as complex and expensive as a SSBN. Chapter 4 will further 
analyze whether fielding an SSBN will assist in India’s bid for regional hegemony or will 
end up creating more problems along the way.  
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III. CHALLENGES INDIA WILL NEED TO OVERCOME TO 
FIELD CREDIBLE SBSD 
After INS ARIHANT’s returned from her maiden patrol voyage in November 
2018, Prime Minster Narendra Modi congratulated her crew on their role in completing 
India’s Nuclear Triad.64 While this accomplishment is an important step along the path 
to creating a credible third leg of the nuclear triad, placing nuclear weapons on a 
submarine in itself is not enough to be considered sufficient in generating a sea-based 
strategic deterrence. India still has many challenges to overcome related to concepts of 
operations, survivability and command and control (C2) before it can be considered 
member of the group of nations possessing a nuclear triad.  
This chapter will begin by reviewing the history of India’s SSBN development 
program including its safety track record so far. Following that, it will explore India’s 
Nuclear deterrence doctrine, as this will shape the unique requirements and challenges 
India will face to create the third leg of the nuclear triad. This chapter will end by 
describing the various challenges India is likely to face on its path to creating a credible 
SSBD. Safety will be a common theme throughout as each challenge will present a safety 
component. Throughout this chapter, other nation’s path to establishing an SBSD will be 
referenced, as India will likely face similar difficulties. 
A. HISTORY OF INDIA’S SSBN PROGRAM AND SAFETY RECORD OF 
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES 
India’s nuclear submarine journey from inception to current INS ARIHANT 
deployment status has suffered from multiple setbacks to include mission creep, 
technological obstacles, and deadly safety accidents. India’s plans for putting nuclear 
reactors on maritime platforms began in 1965, but the initial motivation was merely to 
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develop possible technologies with nuclear energy.65 Yogesh Joshi notes that it was the 
USS EISENHOWER’s deployment during the 1971 Bangladesh that provided the 
impetus for India to develop nuclear submarines. Unable to indigenously develop a viable 
miniaturized reactor, India turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. This assistance 
came in the form of a leased a Soviet Charlie-class cruise-missile and the training 
necessary to operate this submarine. The Advanced Technology Vehicle Project (ATVP) 
emerged sometime in the mid-1980s, with the goal of creating an indigenous SSN with 
the help of the Soviet Union.66 
With India’s successful nuclear weapons test in 1998, the ATVP program 
switched gears and changed from developing an SSN to SSBN.67 However, by the time 
this decision was made, the construction of the first nuclear submarine hull was already 
underway. The size limitations of the original SSN design greatly reduce both the payload 
and range of the ballistic missiles that can be loaded onto the INS ARIHANT.68 As a 
result of this mission creep, Joshi argues that the INS ARIHANT will never be a credible 
deterrence toward China, and at most will be a test platform/technology demonstrator for 
future submarine technologies.69  
During India’s relatively short time span of operating submarines, there have been 
many accidents which might suggest India’s culture of safety may not be up to the level 
necessary to safely operate submarines carrying nuclear weapons. Submarines are 
extremely complex platforms operating under some of the world’s most extreme 
conditions.70 Zia Mian notes adding a nuclear reactor and weapons onboard increase the 
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complexity to where even established Nuclear nations continue to make safety errors 
even with decades of operating experience.  
Since the emergence of nuclear power submarines, there have been 41 accidents, 
22 of which have occurred on Soviet Union/Russian submarines.71 The Indian Navy 
receives submarine training and leases from the Russians, which could be cause for 
concern about the safety culture that the Indian submariners are receiving. However, 
other established nuclear nations such as the UK have also been found to have lacking 
safety cultures. Mian notes that a report by a UK Nuclear Safety expert states, “Current 
UK practice falls significantly short of benchmarked relevant good practice” and also 
notes “[The UK] ‘has been formally reprimanded by its internal safety regulator for five 
nuclear safety breaches’ between 2010 and 2017.”72  
During India’s short tenure of operating submarines, there have already been a 
few major accidents. In February 2014, a fire broke out onboard INS SINDHURATNA, 
killing two and injuring seven – cause of fire was blamed on not properly following 
standard operating procedures.73 In August 2013, INS SINDHURAKSHAK experienced 
an explosion and sank while pier side and making preparations for a patrol. All 18 sailors 
on board died.74  The specifics of the accident have not been publicly released, so it is 
currently unknown if the Indian Navy has taken the proper actions to avoid similar 
accidents in the future.75 More recently in 2018, INS ARIHANT was out of commission 
for approximately 10 months, due to a hatch being left open while pier side, causing 
flooding throughout the ship.76 The publicized root cause of this accident is questionable 
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,but more importantly continues to highlight concerns about India’s ability to safely 
operate SSBNs.  
The lacking safety culture seems to be widespread within India’s nuclear 
program, which India will need to change in order to successfully field an SSBN program. 
Mian notes “There is ample evidence for the occurrence of ‘accidents and failures of 
safety systems’ at these facilities and of ‘organizational characteristics that violate the 
recommendations of safety theorists’ and therefore, there are doubts about whether these 
institutions can ‘meet the demanding organizational requirements for safe operations of 
a complex, high hazard technology.”77 A culture of safety is critical when operating 
either submarines or nuclear weapons on their own, but combining them together requires 
a zero-mistake mentality that is difficult to achieve.  
B. INDIA’S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE DOCTRINE 
In order to get an idea of the requirements for India’s goal for a credible sea-based 
strategic deterrence, it is important to review India’s nuclear doctrine, which states, 
“India’s nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows: Building and maintaining a 
credible minimum deterrent; A posture of ‘No First Use’: nuclear weapons will only be 
used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces 
anywhere; Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict 
unacceptable damage. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the civilian 
political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.”78  
The key components of India’s nuclear deterrence doctrine are assured retaliation 
inflicting unacceptable damage while maintaining a minimal sized arsenal. The SSBN, 
while extremely expensive and technically demanding fulfills the aforementioned 
requirements. Assured retaliation posits that nuclear deterrence can be achieved with a 
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relatively small arsenal of warheads, provided these warheads are invulnerable to enemy 
destruction.79 Regardless of size, in warhead quantity or yield, or accuracy of the 
adversary’s nuclear arsenal, they would be deterred from firing the first shot at fear of an 
unacceptable retaliatory strike. A couple of retaliatory nuclear bombs dropped into a 
major metropolitan area would be sufficient in most cases. The idea to credibly maintain 
deterrence with a small number of weapons is especially attractive to countries like India 
who want to maintain an image of being a “peaceful” nation and whose economy is 
unable to compete with rivals like China in terms of sheer payload quantity.  
The nuclear launch platform that most closely satisfies the “invulnerable to enemy 
destruction” criteria of assured retaliation is the SSBN submarine. SSBNs can hide within 
the depths of the vast ocean, ready to counterattack, even if the submarine and her crew’s 
home nation is completely annihilated from a massive attack of any kind. Though with 
advancements of Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology, SSBNs may longer be 
stealthy enough to fulfill this survivability role.80 However, the SSBN currently reins as 
the undisputed most survivable leg of the nuclear deterrence triad.  
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
The primary concepts of operations for SSBNs are Continuous-at-sea-deterrence 
(CASD) as the United States has done since the Cold War.81 Alternatively operating in 
safe waters near home, known as the “bastion strategy” employed by the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War.82 Both strategies have merits and drawbacks, and the optimum 
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strategy for a country depends as much on their technological prowess and naval 
capabilities as their geopolitical situation. 
The CASD, forward deployed strategy allows SSBNs to operate in larger, 
unpredictable patrol locations and fire missiles from unsuspecting and hard to detect 
angles. The CASD offers the best survivability and assurance of a second retaliatory 
nuclear strike. The ultimate form of SBSD, as the adversary can never be sure if all 
SSBNs are destroyed. However, few if any countries outside of the United States have 
the luxuries of sea superiority, forward basing, and superior submarine technology 
required to operate SSBNs vast distances away from home for long periods of time. 
Operating in hostile waters also usually requires SSNs (nuclear attack submarines) to 
defend the SSBNs from enemy surface and subsurface platforms. This extremely 
resource and expertise intensive method of operating SSBNs is even difficult for the 
United States to maintain. After years of high operation tempo and underfunding, the 
signs of this strategy’s unsustainability are beginning to show; with the COLUMBIA 
class submarine behind schedule and overall fleet size being downsized.83 
 The UK and France also operate in a CASD posture, but at a much smaller force 
structure than the United States. The UK and France have a total of four SSBNs, with 
only one on constant patrol.84 Brustlein notes that four is believed to be the minimum 
required number of submarines to ensure one submarine is always available on deterrence 
patrol.  
Another challenge India must overcome to utilize the CSAD will be maintaining 
the minimum amount of SSBNs on constant patrol. The primary limiting factor to 
consider is the reactors refueling cycle. ARIHANT’s current reactor is presumed to be at 
the level of first- or second-generation Soviet technology.85 The endurance of this reactor 
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will require India to field more than the minimum of four that the UK and French 
maintain.  
The “bastion” strategy, coined by U.S. analysts during the Cold War, was the sea-
based deterrence operation method used by the Soviet Union to protect their SSBNs from 
United States’ ASW assets.86 The Soviet Union deployed their SSBNs in the Barents Sea 
and Sea of Okhotsk and protected them with SSNs and land-based aircraft.87 By 
patrolling SSBNs in safe coastal waters, the submarine is more easily protected by land-
based and surface Navy weapon systems. The endurance and resilience of the submarine 
becomes less problematic due to operating within close proximity of home bases. Also, 
fewer SSBNs are required to maintain a constant deterrence. However, placing 
submarines within a confined area makes it a lot easier to monitor and predict the 
direction of potential missile launches. Potential adversaries will also have a much easier 
time hunting the submarines provided they have the capabilities and motivation to do so. 
Using this concept of operation also requires that the adversaries’ high-value targets are 
within missile range from the operating “bastion” 
Regardless of the whether India has nearby waters that could constitute as a 
bastion, it will still have to defend its SSBNs within the operating areas. When the Soviet 
Union pulled its SSBNs closer to home, operating within the Barents Sea, it had to defend 
its nuclear assets with convention Naval Surface ships and SSN attack submarines. The 
Indian Navy will likely face similar defense challenges, especially since China already 
leverages a conventional Naval superiority.  
D. SURVIVABILITY 
Survivability of a nuclear submarine while underway is the primary, if not sole 
reason SSBNs continued to exist in nuclear deterrence theory, even while cheaper and 
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safer methods of deterrence exist.88 However, submarines are not inherently survivable, 
and depend on the design, deployment strategy, and operating nation’s ability to defend 
against an adversaries’ anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts.  
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was forced to retreat into operating its 
nuclear submarines into bastions due to United States’ ASW technology. The United 
States set up a system of underwater surveillance system known as U.S. Navy’s Sound 
Surveillance System (SOSUS).89 Wueger notes, with the SOSUS, U.S. forces were able 
to more easily track Soviet Submarines as they passed the Greenland-Iceland-UK 
(GIUK) gap. However, once operating inside these bastions, the Soviet Union was then 
faced with the challenge of defending its submarine forces within a smaller, easier to 
search area. 
Whether India decides to operate under the CASD or bastion model of patrol, 
survivability of India’s deployed submarines will depend on its ability to overcome 
reactor design deficiencies, evade enemy ASW, and protect its SSBNs with other 
conventional assets. INS ARIHANT’s current reactor design raises concerns of 
endurance, as its first deterrence patrol lasted only 20 days.90 This endurance severely 
limits the ARIHANT’s possible patrol area, reducing the amount of time it can credibly 
threaten enemy targets, while making it easier to enemies to determine its position. 
Coupled with India’s current lack of Intercontinental SLBM, this lack of operational 
range presents a significant problem the Indian subsurface navy must overcome.  
E. COMMAND AND CONTROL  
The control of nuclear weapons in India is traditionally firmly held under the 
civilian leadership’s control. However, subsurface nuclear launch platforms require a 
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unique command and control structure that may pose both bureaucratic and technological 
obstacles for India to overcome.  
The Command and Control of all nuclear weapons must strike a balance of the 
always/never dilemma. The always/never dilemma posits that nuclear weapon 
employment must always be successful when ordered, but never launched accidentally.91 
Positive control processes help ensure the “always,” whereas negative control processes 
ensure the “never.” India’s current solution to this problem involves managing its nuclear 
arsenal in a “de-mated” configuration. The warheads are in the custody of civilian 
organizations, while the military controls the missiles.92 The warhead and missiles are 
assembled when the time for launch comes. India’s reasoning for this type of vulnerable 
nuclear posture seems to stem mostly from the civilian’s long-standing distrust of the 
military.93  
Nuclear weapons on SSBNs cannot exist in a “de-mated” configuration, they must 
be fully assembled before being loaded into their launching tubes, which does create a 
risk of inadvertent or unauthorized launch. India’s leadership will need to figure out how 
to solve the always/never dilemma with ready to launch nuclear weapons in military 
custody, a nuclear posture they are unfamiliar with. As of now, India plans to continue 
leaning toward negative control processes for their subsurface nuclear weapons by 
utilizing a three-phase process of operationalization.94 Joshi summarizes, during peace 
time, the submarines will not be constantly patrolling armed with nuclear weapons, but 
rather be sitting pier side ready to be deployed. At the first sign of possible crisis or 
conflict, the nuclear warheads would be assembled with their missiles and loaded onto 
their submarines. The submarines would then get underway and sail to certain positions 
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while waiting for the final authorization to launch their weapons. This method of 
employment has many drawbacks and is not a nuclear triad in the traditional sense. 
India’s SSBN fleet while waiting pier side also raises security and safety 
concerns. With modern ISR technology, adversaries can easily determine where the 
SSBNs are sitting pier side. Conventional strikes on these vulnerable SSBNs could easily 
take down then entire sea-based leg of India’s nuclear triad. Theft of fully mated nuclear 
weapons also becomes a concern, something India has not had to worry about in the past 
due to the de-mated nature of its nuclear weapons. 
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IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES INDIA 
WILL FACE WHILE ESTABLISHING SBSD 
As discussed in the previous chapter, India has many obstacles to overcome before 
it can claim it has developed a sea-based strategic deterrence. The majority, if not all of 
these challenges have been experienced and overcome by other nations with an operational 
nuclear triad. India can take advantage of the lessons learned from other nuclear nations 
and greatly accelerate the SSBN program development; saving money, time, and most 
importantly, the lives of the brave submariners that will be manning these untested 
platforms.  
Although a proven path exists to overcome India’s likely challenges, the costs of 
tackling these issues will likely come with many trade-offs, especially within India’s Navy 
modernization efforts. The cost of developing a credible SBSD goes beyond just 
manufacturing a submarine capable of launching nuclear weapons but requires an extensive 
supporting infrastructure. The cost of gaining the capability of SBSD, will likely come at 
the cost of losing capabilities that only traditional naval forces can provide. Critical 
capabilities that are better suited to dealing with India’s security concerns and aiding its 
bid for great power status.  
This chapter will briefly review each challenge that India will likely face on its path 
to developing its SSBN program. The methods which other nations overcame these 
challenges will be presented, and recommendations will be given on how India can 
overcome those challenges. This chapter will conclude on recommendations that India’s 
security concerns and goals of regional hegemony may be better accomplished with 
traditional naval roles.  
A. SAFETY 
Safety should always be the priority when operating a submarine, and the addition 
of a nuclear reactor and nuclear weapons only decreases the margin for error. As with most 
platforms in the Navy, a submarine is not merely a weapon system, but also the living space 
of upwards of thousands of sailors. Many accidents, such as fire and flooding, are relatively 
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survivable on surface platforms, but become catastrophic losses of life on submarines. 
Possible radioactive contamination from nuclear submarine accidents adds further to the 
case that the importance of safety on an SSBN cannot be understated.  
The Indian Navy has already suffered quite a few submarine accidents, as described 
in the previous chapter. The Indian navy peacetime losses have been approximately one 
warship every five years since 1990, and two every year since 2004.95 Sandeep Unnithan 
notes that not all accidents can be blamed on aging platforms but were due to lack of 
compliance with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). This poor safety record is 
concerning as India seeks to operate a fleet of SSBNs. The United States’ and Russia’s 
development of SSBNs provide possible courses of actions India could emulate.  
Out of the innumerable contributions ADM Rickover made to the United States 
nuclear submarine program, the most important was his emphasis on safety above all else. 
After the loss of USS THRESHER, ADM Rickover established the Submarine Safety 
Program (SUBSAFE). Operating safely became his number one concern, both in the 
engineering of the submarine reactors and strict adherence to standard operating principles 
and engineering processes.96 His focus on safety may have stifled some innovation in 
reactor technology; with some research on more compact and quiet reactor designs being 
denied funding because of his influence.97 Nevertheless, the results of his unwavering 
philosophy on safety has paid dividends for the United States; not a single submarine has 
been lost since the USS THRESHER nor has there been a single reactor accident.98 
The Soviet Union’s development of SSBNs will probably continue to be contained 
within classified documents for the foreseeable future. However, one can arguably deduce 
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that Russia did not follow in America’s “Safety First” philosophy, simply by reviewing 
Russia’s track record of submarine accidents. Since the 1960s, Russia has experienced 13 
different nuclear reactor related accidents, whereas the United States has had zero.99 In the 
same time frame, the Soviet Union suffered at least five major submarine accidents, with 
likely many more having gone unreported or classified.100 The United States has only 
suffered one, the USS THRESHER, which occurred before SUBSAFE was created. Rear 
Admiral Oliver notes that, “The Soviets have directed some of their finest young men to 
their submarine program, and these men have served with distinction, performing many 
brave and self-less acts. The difference between the two countries was and remains one of 
culture.” Rear ADM Oliver convincingly argues that it was not superior scientists or 
submarine technology that gave the United States the upper hand in SSBN development, 
but ultimately the culture of safety that ADM Rickover tireless created and maintained 
throughout his naval career.  
The emphasis on creating a culture of safety is something India should begin 
molding now. As of date no SUBSAFE equivalent program exists in the Indian Navy, even 
though the idea has been discussed and written about in Indian leadership circles.101 Capt. 
Jawahar Bhagwat PhD (RET), Former submarine captain of the INS CHAKRA, INS 
SHISHUMAR and INS SHALKI notes, “when we shift to an advanced weapon platform, 
following in the footsteps of technologically advanced navies, it is incumbent upon us to 
observe the safety regulations and practices which they observe.”102 
Although the Soviet Union eventually established a functioning nuclear triad, the 
Indian Navy, particularly the submariner community, should view the Soviet Union model 
of SSBN development as a constant warning; any perceived savings gained by cutting 
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corners, will likely be later paid in blood. Additionally, The Soviet Union’s model likely 
only achieved success due to their relatively strong economy and existential threat from 
the United States during the Cold War. It is also important to remember that the Soviet 
Union eventually collapsed and the modern-day Russian SSBN fleet is a mere shadow of 
its Cold War prime.103 
While India can gain substantial knowledge and lessons from the United States’ 
SSBN achievements, the benefits from Russian offered assistance should not be 
overlooked. Through the leasing of Russian submarines, and hands-on training from 
experienced Russian submariners, India can save time and money from not having to 
develop everything from ground-zero. The Indian Navy seems to have not taken full 
advantage of its first lease from the Russian Navy. In a communication to Capt. Bhagwat 
(RET), Rear Admiral R.K. Sharma, a former captain of Chakra-1 stated, “It is rare that a 
navy takes a nuclear submarine on lease and then returns it without getting sufficient 
experience in exploiting this versatile platform.”104 For Chakra – 2, India must strive to 
obtain as much experience as possible while learning extensively from their Russian 
counterparts. 
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
The concept of operations for SSBNs on a nuclear deterrence patrol is another 
critical issue that India will face as it operationalizes its nuclear triad. The two primary 
methods as discussed previously are continuous at sea deterrence and bastion strategy. Both 
strategies were successfully employed during the Cold war. However, given India’s 
geographical location and current state of technology, neither concepts of operations are 
entirely feasible. In order to expediate the process of developing a credible SBSD, India 
will need to decide which concept of operation to focus on and start taking the necessary 
steps towards that goal.  
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If India decides to attempt the CASD method of operation, submarine hull 
resilience and reactor endurance are key areas of focus. Due to the fact that SSBNs are 
carrying nuclear warheads as well as fissionable nuclear fuel, accidents at sea can become 
particularly devasting. After a catastrophic incident, the submarine may have to limp vast 
distances in order to reach a port capable and willing to conduct repairs. Many foreign ports 
are either incapable of safely handling nuclear material or are unwilling due to the concerns 
of radioactive contamination. The “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” which 
76 nations are signatories of, bans the stationing of nuclear weapons on their sovereign 
territory.105 
The United States is able to operate far from home both due to its excellent reactor 
design and safety protocols, along with its many forward operating bases and agreements 
with allied nations. The latter requires significant resources and political capital to achieve. 
India’s unwillingness to form alliances greatly reduces its options in both establishing 
forward operating bases or agreements with foreign nations. So far India’s Arihant class 
submarines have not shown the ability to operate for long periods of time even barring 
minor accidents. Without the support infrastructure to safely operate its SSBN fleet, each 
underway could become a very costly and risky endeavor. India should begin laying the 
groundwork for overseas docking agreements with the other nations surrounding the IOR. 
These agreements usually take some time to figure out, and infrastructure will likely need 
to be constructed to support these agreements. 
India would likely find more success in emulating the UK/France model of CASD. 
The French deterrence policy of strict sufficiency is more like India’s posture of credible 
minimum deterrence.106 The UK/France model would allow India to build and maintain a 
smaller submarine force, while providing deterrence coverage at all times. India’s focus 
would need to be to build a reactor with enough endurance to allow for enough time 
between refueling and repair of the other submarines within the fleet.  
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The current reactor core on India’s INS Arihant platform will require refueling 
every few years which is a labor-intensive process that involves cutting the hull open, 
replacing the uranium rods, and rewelding the submarine.107 This process would take 18–
24 months, thus Former Chief of the Indian Navy Arun Prakash suggests that India will 
require at least 3 – 4 SSBNs to ensure that one SSBN is patrolling each of India’s major 
seas - The Bay of Bengal and The Arabian Sea.108 It is important to note that the 3–
4 submarine estimate is the bare minimum required, as any delays in refueling or 
unplanned maintenance would quickly result in periods of gapped patrol coverage. 
Admiral (RET) Pradesh estimates that 8–12 submarines would need to be fielded before 
India had a reliable and consistent SBSD.109 
If India prefers to utilize the bastion strategy, it will have to develop longer range 
missiles, SSBNs capable of carrying those missiles, and a safe haven to operate out of. 
India’s current missile technology is not capable of operating in a bastion type SBSD. The 
projected twelve Sagarika K-15 SLBM loaded onto the INS Arihant have a predicted range 
of 700 to 800 kilometers.110 Rehman notes that with that range, the INS Arihant would be 
unable to even target Lahore nor Islamabad from the Arabian Sea. Striking major Chinese 
cities is completely out of the question with the K-15s. India is currently developing two 
longer range missiles, the K-4 and K-5. The K-4 has been successfully test launched from 
a floating platform, however, in its current form, cannot fit into the Arihant platform.111 
Rehman states that even if the engineers manage to reduce the size of the K-4 missile onto 
the ARIHANT, the range would barely reach major Chinese cities from the eastern edge 
of the Bay of Bengal. The K-5 missiles that would reach China from anywhere within the 
Bay of Bengal are still in the design phase and would also likely be too big to fit within 
Arihant’s launch tubes.  
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As noted previously, India does not have an ideal bastion to operate out, as neither 
the Bay of Bengal nor the Arabian sea are fully under India’s sea control. Operating within 
either area will require additional naval assets to protect Indian SSBNs within the bastion. 
India will need to continue modernizing its traditional naval assets to counter a 
conventionally superior PLAN. A task that may prove to be difficult given the resources 
being pulled away to fund the SSBN program. India may have to settle with operating 
under a hybrid model; a CASD within the confines of the IOR.  
C. SURVIVABILITY  
The primary concerns for the survivability of the Indian Navy SSBN force will be 
remaining undetected for long periods of time from enemy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
assets. The INS ARIHANT or future submarine classes will need to have a reactor 
endurance that will allow it to remain submersed and underway for longer periods of time. 
Submarines are most vulnerable while transiting the surface. Additional surface naval 
platforms or SSNs (nuclear attack submarines) will likely need to be built to protect the 
SSBNs from enemy ASW efforts.  
India will also likely face a similar SOSUS-type system that the Soviet Union 
encountered during the Cold War. China may already have its own indigenously developed 
system in place, which has been called the Undersea Great Wall Project. The Undersea 
Great Wall project is a system of deep-sea sensors, along with manned and unmanned 
surface vessels.112 These various inter-linked systems create a sound barrier, similar to the 
SOSUS in the Cold War, alerting the Chinese to any submarine activity approaching the 
South China Sea. The Indian Navy will have to figure out how to penetrate this barrier 
undetected if India wishes to conduct deterrence patrols outside of the IOR. China also 
reported in 2018 it had installed two underwater sonar sensors in Guam; publicly stated for 
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scientific use, but likely also has the ability to monitor submarines trafficking through the 
region.113 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The final component necessary for India to generate a credible SBSD is a robust 
command and control infrastructure to ensure the SSBNs underway will launch nuclear 
weapons only if and when ordered by proper authorities. The United States uses Permissive 
Action Links (PALS) to prevent nuclear weapons onboard from being launched 
accidentally or without the proper authorization.114 Nuclear weapons can only be launched 
after the proper code has been entered, and only the president or delegated authority has 
the ability to transmit this code.  
India will need to develop a PALs type system along with the ability to trust their 
military submarine commanders. The current three phase plan, focusing heavily on 
negative control processes, diminishes the survivability and assured retaliation benefits 
from a sea-based deterrence. Submarines are most vulnerable when pier side, and SSBNs 
would be especially attractive targets for conventional strikes. The process of preparing 
and loading the nuclear weapons onboard the submarines create a window of opportunity 
for adversaries to attack and may even generate pressure for enemies to attack first, before 
the submarines can safely hide in the oceans.115  
Indian decision-makers realize this plan leaves them vulnerable to a “bolt from the 
blue” attack and Joshi states that India’s leaders seem willing to accept that risk.116 
Accepting of this risk seems to defeat the purpose of having a sea-based strategic 
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deterrence. One of the primary benefits of SBSD is that an adversary can never even 
consider the possibility of using nuclear weapons at any scale, due to assured retaliation. 
In the day and age of satellite imagery, placing the SSBN idly pier side until the time of 
need, creates an opportunity where a massive counterforce nuclear strike could be 
effective. India can counter this challenge by building underwater basing, which would 
allow its SSBN force to transit in and out base undetected. However, this would also be an 
extremely expensive undertaking, putting further strain on India’s already limited Naval 
budget.  
India also needs to build the communication infrastructure necessary to maintain 
an infallible command and control system once the submarines are at sea. In order to 
communicate with submarines at depth, extremely low frequency (ELF) or very low 
frequency (VLF) broadcasts must be used. India currently operates one VLF and one ELF 
station but will require more in order to obtain the redundancy necessary to ensure 
adversaries cannot easily sever these communication paths.117 The survivability and 
redundancy is especially critical in India’s case since it seem unlikely that India plans to 
pre-delegate launch authority to submarine commanders.118 India will likely mimic Cold 
War nuclear powers employment of TACMO aircraft. Admiral (RET) Pradesh himself has 
stated, “the modification of a multi-engine aircraft, with a trailing-wire VLF-ELF antenna, 
is entirely feasible and will probably be adopted for C2 [command and control] once 
SSBNs commence deterrent patrols”.119 
 
E. TRADITIONAL NAVY TRADE OFFS 
The Indian Navy will play a critical role in achieving India’s goals in the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR) and assist in alleviating India’s security concerns. However, given 
the limiting funding of the Indian Navy, expensive acquisitions such as an indigenous 
SSBN should be carefully analyzed on the value they provide towards accomplishing 
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India’s goals. The SSBN program and conventional naval programs will be vying for the 
same portion of the budget. With the limited and unadvised dual use of SSBNs, funding 
into the SSBN program will come directly at the cost of India’s traditional naval arm. 
India’s primary state-actor security concerns arise from Pakistan and China. India’s 
continued development of the SSBN program may raise alarms within Pakistan while 
achieving very little in regard to deterring China.120 Joshi calls this a classic “triangular 
security dilemma.” India’s actions, while intended to strengthen its deterrence against 
China, could be viewed by Pakistan as threatening to the stability of their own nuclear 
deterrence dyad. Pakistan has already responded that they will develop their own solution 
to counter the INS Arihant.121 This solution will likely come in the form of tactical nuclear 
missiles onboard Pakistani Navy diesel submarines.122  
Before India develops missiles that can reach major Chinese cities, China will likely 
be unphased by the INS ARIHANT. China will likely continue to make incursions into the 
IOR to increase influence and control within the region. The Indian Navy’s conventional 
naval forces would be more suitable to countering Chinese influence within the IOR. 
Although the PLAN currently has conventional naval superiority, the Indian navy has the 
advantage of geography within the IOR. This Indian advantage will continue to erode if 
Indian continues to prioritize developing SSBNs over modernizing its other Naval 
platforms.  
The development of a SBSD is also not an effective tool against China’s growing 
influence within the IOR. As China secures bases and ports within the IOR, India’s 
leadership fear encirclement as they look to the navy to counter China’s influence, “Just as 
the PLA navy seems to be concentrating on anti-access warfare so as to prevent the U.S. 
navy from entering into a cross-Straits conflict, the Indian navy is also working towards 
acquiring the ability to deny China access through the Indian Ocean”.123 A fleet of SSBNs 
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would not give the Indian Navy the capabilities needed for this task. A more effective way 
for India to generate an anti-access/denial capability could be a strategically located Naval 
bases, such as on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.  
The strategic potential of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have long been 
understood by Indian analysts, “By virtue of its location the islands therefore provide the 
capability to monitor and, if required, dominate the Strait of Malacca, one of the most 
important shipping lanes in the world.124 However, even though a joint command, the 
Andaman and Nicobar command (ANC) was established in 2001, the island is still 
underdeveloped and has provided limited strategic relevance.125 Mukherjee notes that 
China analysts have called these islands the “metal chain” that could “shut the Malacca 
Strait”.126 The ANC deserves more investment as its strategic value seems to be widely 
accepted. 
Conventional naval assets will help India from exacerbating its triangular security 
dilemma. Other traditional navy platforms can also serve multiple purposes such as HADR, 
NEO, Anti-piracy, and other methods of projecting soft power. India’s goals of countering 
China’s incursion into the IOR, achieving regional hegemony and becoming a provider of 
net security, depend on its abilities to accomplish these missions.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The research of this thesis set out to determine two main hypothesis 1) India’s 
pursuit of SBSD will increase or has already increased India’s stability and security within 
the IOR and 2) India’s pursuit of SBSD leaves India vulnerable to other security threats 
while it attempts to achieve a credible sea-based deterrence. This research has found little 
evidence to support the first hypothesis as the SSBN development has not generated any 
additional deterrence value towards China, while unintentionally creating possibilities for 
instability as Pakistan responds by nuclearizing its navy. More evidence exists to provide 
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support for the second hypothesis. India will likely suffer many losses from submarine 
accidents and spend a large portion, of its already limited naval budget, on developing the 
required infrastructure to establish a SBSD. The investment spent on developing a credible 
SBSD will come at the cost of funding that could have been used on modernizing India’s 
conventional naval assets. Naval assets that arguably provide more capabilities that India 
needs to accomplish its aspirations of influencing the IOR.  
Moving forward, India should re-evaluate whether the SSBN will provide 
capabilities and outcomes it desires and is not merely an attempt for international prestige. 
As Iskander Rehman, along with other researchers, argue at least part of India’s insistence 
on developing the SSBN is to gain international recognition among the world powers. 
India’s 2004 maritime doctrine states “India stands out alone [among NFU nuclear powers] 
as being devoid of a credible nuclear triad”.127 World powers gain prestige with the control 
and influence they wield, not from being able to field advanced weapon systems.  
None of this is to state that the obstacles laying in India’s path to developing a 
SBSD are insurmountable for a developing nation like India. However, the rationale for 
continuing down this path needs to be reviewed against the backdrop of India’s unique 
geopolitical situation and related security concerns. The effort in blood, sweat, and treasure 
expended to develop the sea-based deterrence may have made sense for the bipolar 
competition that the United States and Soviet Union faced during the Cold War. Whether 
the SSBN aids India’s bid for regional hegemony and great power status, necessitates a 
closer looked before diving in full speed ahead. 
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